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HOSPITALS, PHYSICIANS, AND HEALTH
INSURERS: GUARDING AGAINST
IMPLIED AGREEMENTS IN THE
HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
ANTHONY J. DENNIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the health care industry,' coupled with the
skyrocketing costs2 of health care, has resulted in increased scrutiny of
the industry by the public, press, politicians, and federal and state regula-
tors. Various public interest groups, journalists, legislators, and presi-
dential candidates have assailed the manner in which health care is
financed and delivered in America. The escalating costs of health care
have placed health care issues firmly on the national political agenda
The health care industry has responded to these attacks through a va-
* Counsel at Aetna Life and Casualty Company; a member of the National Health Lawyers
Association and the Health Care and Insurance Industry Committees of the Antitrust Section,
American Bar Association. Admitted to practice in Connecticut and the District of Columbia, Mr.
Dennis received a J.D. from Northwestern University School of Law and a B.A., cum laude, from
Tufts University.
The author would like to thank all those who reviewed and commented on this Article. The views
expressed in this Article are solely the author's own and do not reflect the views of the Aetna Life
and Casualty Company.
1. See N. Motenko, Health Care Developments, 60 ANTrrRUST L.J. 639, 648 (1991)
("[Hlealth care is now the number one industry in the United States.").
2. See Robert Pear, States Are Moving To Re-Regulation Of Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1992, at Al. "From 1981 to 1991, medical prices rose more than twice as fast as the Consumer
Price Index for all items. Total national spending on health care soared to $738 billion last year,
from $290 billion in 1981." Id. Geraldine Alpert & Thomas R. McCarthy, Beyond Goldfarlx Ap-
plying Traditional Antitrust Analysis to Changing Health Markets, 29 AN1TrRUSr BULL. 165, 166
(Summer 1984).
Rising costs of health care have been a concern of the public and policy makers for at least
a decade as health expenditures have soared, accounting for a growing proportion of the
gross national product (GNP). In 1950 national health expenditures represented 4.4 per-
cent of GNP. Today they represent over 10 percent and are rising to an estimated 12
percent of GNP by 1990. Even in constant dollar terms, per capita personal health ex-
penditures rose at a rate of 4.8 percent per year between 1950 and 1980.
Id.
3. The health care issue vaulted Harris Wofford from Pennsylvania, the dark horse Demo-
cratic contender for the late Senator John Heinz's Senate seat, to the United States Senate in 1991
over former United States Attorney General and former Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thorn-
burgh. See Health, the Lose-Lose Issue, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1991, 27, 27. The issue of health care
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riety of means. In addition to the public relations campaign normally
expected in such a situation, the industry has also engaged in a variety of
novel financing arrangements in an attempt to reduce the costs of health
care. These new financing arrangements have prompted hospitals, physi-
cians, and health insurers to enter into new contractual relationships
with one another and thus have derivatively increased the risk that they
may violate or be accused of violating the federal antitrust laws.
Moreover, in the 1980s federal authorities vigorously began to apply
federal antitrust laws to the health care industry. The authorities hoped
that such an enforcement initiative would discourage anti-competitive
behavior and consequently curb escalating medical costs. As a result of
these developments, antitrust counseling in the health care industry has
grown increasingly important over the last several years.
All members of the health care industry, medical providers and health
insurers alike, need to be sensitive to the antitrust laws and learn to avoid
high-risk behavior. This Article discusses and explores the importance of
the federal antitrust laws to the health care industry in the provider net-
work context and then suggests guidelines for avoiding antitrust liability.
A. Health Care Financing and Delivery: Old Staples and New
Techniques
Indemnity insurance has been the traditional staple of the health care
industry.4 Under an indemnity plan, the health care insurer-known as
a third-party payor in insurance parlance-promises to pay eighty per-
cent of the cost of medical services covered by the insurance contract
while the insured party-the patient-pays the remaining twenty per-
cent.5 Unfortunately, indemnity insurance does not assist in curtailing
medical costs for several reasons. First, the physician who prescribes
medical treatment has no incentive to utilize the least expensive tests and
procedures since the doctor is assured of receiving full payment by a
combination of the patient and the health insurer. Second, the patient
has little or no incentive to demand less expensive medical treatment
since the indemnity insurer pays the lion's share of the cost. Finally, the
cost and delivery also figured prominently in the 1992 Presidential election. See Susan Dentzer,
Clinton's Big Test, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1992, 26, 26-30.
4. See Edward P. Potanka, Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: A Legal Overview 1,
4, 6 (May 22, 1989) (paper presented to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel, on file with
author).
5. Id.
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indemnity insurer is frequently able to recover its costs and a certain
level of profit by charging higher health insurance premiums. Thus,
none of the three parties in the typical health care transaction has a mo-
tive to lower costs when indemnity insurance covers the claim.
The concept of managed care6 was introduced in earnest in the early
1980s largely to inject price competition into the health care marketplace
and to curtail increasing medical costs.7 Managed care plans offer pre-
paid health insurance in which customers pay an up-front fee or pre-
mium in return for nearly unlimited access to a network of medical
providers at little or no additional cost.8 Such plans include health main-
tenance organizations ("HMOs"), 9 preferred provider organizations
("PPOs")YO and several variations11 on these two basic managed care en-
6. A federal district court in Kansas characterized managed care as an "emerging alternative
delivery system" that "radically alter[s] traditional notions about delivery and financing health
care." Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1371 (D. Kan. 1987) (Reazin
II). The court mentioned Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") and Preferred Provider
Organizations ("PPOs") as examples of such alternative delivery systems. Id.
7. See Robert J. Enders, Alternative Delivery Systems, in ANTrrRusr HEALTH CARE EN-
FORCEMENT AND ANALYSIS 195, 195-96 (M. Elizabeth Gee ed., 1992); Potanka, supra note 4, at 5,
9-17; Peter D. Fox, Forward: Overview of Managed Care Trends, in THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MAN-
AGED CARE 1-5 (Susan K. Chambers ed., 1990); Hal Belodoff, HMOs-New Challenges-New Prod-
ucts, in THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE, supra, at 241, 241-42.
8. See Gary S. Davis, Introduction: Managed Health Care Primer, in THE INSIDER'S GUIDE
TO MANAGED CARE, supra note 7, at 13-29; Fox, supra note 7, at 1; Potanka, supra note 4, at 6-17.
9. HMO enrollees, also known as subscribers, are directed to use only those health care prov-
iders who are members of that particular HMO's provider network. Enrollees who use network
providers for the treatment of conditions covered by the HMO contract pay no deductible, and the
HMO directly pays for the cost of treatment. On the other hand, enrollees who obtain treatment
outside the provider network must pay 100% of the medical expenses and receive no reimbursement
from the HMO plan. Thus, patients are strongly steered toward using the provider network, thereby
guaranteeing a patient flow that enables HMOs to conclude volume-discount deals with providers.
HMOs then pass the cost savings to the consumer in the form of a reduced price for health insur-
ance-the cost of membership in the HMO. See Harold S. Luft, How Do Health-Maintenance Orga-
nizations Achieve Their Savings?, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1336, 1336 (1978); Linda E. Demkovich,
"PPO" - Three Letters That May Form One Answer to Runaway Health Costs, 15 NAT'L J. 1176
(1983) (explaining the differences and similarities between IMOs, PPOs, and fee-for-service ar-
rangements); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 956-57 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Reazin III).
HMOs and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs") are so-called "alternative delivery
systems" which have emerged as cost-effective alternatives to traditional indemnity insur-
ance. HMOs and PPOs are prospective reimbursement arrangements, in which a member
or subscriber pays a monthly amount to medical care providers [or managed care compa-
nies] who then oversee all the health care needs of the member. In an HMO or PPO, the
member typically pays less for health care coverage than under a traditional indemnity
insurance plan, but is limited in his or her choice of medical care providers.
rd.
10. Similar to those who belong to an IMO, enrollees in a PPO are encouraged to use provid-
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tities. Managed care has been somewhat more successful in influencing
physician behavior regarding the selection of less expensive medical
treatment.12
Under a managed care approach, physicians and other medical provid-
ers such as hospitals, allied health professionals, and outpatient surgery
centers commonly enter into capitation contracts with managed care
companies to provide medical services to plan members.13 A capitation
contract typically contains, inter alia, a payment provision in which the
health care provider receives an annual or periodic payment for each en-
rollee in the plan, regardless of the amount of care actually rendered.
Health care providers in a managed care provider network normally do
not receive any additional payments from the managed care plan for
treating member patients.
Managed care plans control medical treatment costs by inducing prov-
iders to prescribe low-cost, yet medically appropriate, care. Since medi-
cal providers receive only discounted, or capitated, fees for services
rendered, they attempt to reduce their operating costs so that the capita-
tion payment they receive yields some net profit. Consequently, a capita-
tion contract may be viewed as a volume discount contract in which the
provider assumes some financial risk.
Managed care plans bargain with health care providers for the lowest
possible price for medical services. These plans are able to obtain
favorable prices by promising a sizable volume of patients who are enroll-
ees or subscribers of the plan. However, providers bear the risk that the
plan will not provide enough enrollees to make it economically worth-
ers in the PPO provider network. If the PPO enrollees do use PPO providers, they pay little or no
deductible; the PPO directly covers the costs. Unlike an HMO, however, a PPO will partially cover
the cost of medical care rendered by providers who do not belong to the PPO's provider network.
Thus, members of a PPO's provider network are said to be "preferred." As a result, patient steerage
is also not as strong in a PPO. See Luft, supra note 9, at 1337; Demkovich, supra note 9, at 1176;
see generally Robert E. Youle & Paul C. Daw, Preferred Provider Organizations: An Antitrust Per-
spective, 29 ANTrTRusT BULL. 301, 303-04 (Summer 1984).
11. In the last few years, the area of managed care has become a veritable alphabet soup of
names and abbreviations. Managed care organizations have also begun to sell their services on a
stand alone, or unbundled, basis. For example, managed care plans have rented their provider net-
works to others, including self-insured groups. They have sold their services as third-party adminis-
trators ("TPAs"). TPAs process the insurance related paperwork, including claim forms, without
assuming the underlying insurance risk.
12. See supra note 9.
13. See Gerald L. Coe & Jeffrey M. Sconyers, Contracting (Risk-Provider Oriented), in THE
INSIDER's GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE, supra note 7, at 78, 82-83; Davis, supra note 8, at 27;
Potanka, supra note 4, at 9.
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while since it is impossible to guarantee a certain level of enrollment.
Furthermore, no guarantee exists that the population of enrollees will be
relatively healthy, a key factor which affects the ability to keep operating
costs at a minimum.
Managed care plans also curb increasing health care costs by engaging
in various forms of utilization review. Utilization review consists of an
in-house review of the treatment the plan physicians or other plan medi-
cal providers prescribe.14 Pursuant to utilization review, managed care
plans will intervene when a lower cost, medically appropriate alternative
is available.
Managed care has forced participants in the health care marketplace
into new contractual relationships with one another. Insurance compa-
nies now bargain and contract directly with hospitals and physicians for
high-quality, low-cost medical care instead of passively reimbursing them
for the care rendered. As a result, medical providers have become more
savvy and sophisticated. For example, some physicians have organized
independent practice or physician associations ("IPAs") in order to com-
bine and leverage their bargaining power with the insurance companies.
In addition, some hospitals have used their affiliations with other hospi-
tals or formed physician-hospital organizations ("PHOs") in order to
bargain more effectively with health insurers.'5
B. Crashing the Party: Antitrust, the Federal Government, and Eager
Plaintiffs
These new structures and contractual relationships inevitably brought
increased regulatory scrutiny and litigation. Federal and state regula-
tors, as well as private plaintiffs, often use antitrust law as their weapon
of choice in the health care context. In the early 1980s, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division of the United
14. A combination of doctors and registered nurses who are employees of the managed care
plan typically conduct utilization review. The nurses ordinarily handle routine medical review situa-
tions. The medical doctors, who often carry the title of "medical director" within the managed care
plans, review the treatment of complex or life-threatening medical conditions. Managed care plans
also involve doctors in the provider network in utilization review. A patient's primary care physi-
cian ("PCP") acts as a gatekeeper who monitors the level of care and decides whether to refer the
patient to another provider for more specialized care. See Potanka, supra note 4, at 10-11. Man-
aged care plans also use pre-admission certification and continued stay review to control costs.
Under these two programs, patients must obtain the health plan's prior approval before undergoing
certain medical procedures or extending their hospital stays. See Potanka, supra note 4, at 14-16.
15. See Davis, supra note 8, at 16; Noah D. Rosenberg, Independent Practice Associations with
Checklist, in THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE, supra note 7, at 263, 266-67.
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States Department of Justice ("DOJ")-the two federal agencies charged
with enforcing the federal antitrust laws-began an explicit and highly
visible campaign to attack perceived antitrust violations within the health
care industry. The agencies initiated antitrust suits against doctors,1 6
challenged hospital mergers, 17 and issued numerous press releases. 8
Furthermore, the leadership of the FTC and the Antitrust Division of
the DOJ delivered several public speeches to underscore the applicability
of the federal antitrust laws to the health care industry and to emphasize
the federal government's objective to commence criminal enforcement
actions whenever appropriate.19 These events demonstrated that an era
of antitrust enforcement had clearly arrived for the health care industry.
These developments shocked many in the health care industry. Doc-
tors believed that because they practiced a "profession" not a "trade,"
they were immune from the Sherman Antitrust Act which regulates
"trade or commerce. ' 20 In the mid-1970s, the courts eliminated the so-
called "learned professions" exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
thus bringing doctors, lawyers, and other professionals within the scope
of the antitrust statutes.21 For their part, insurance companies had al-
16. See, e-g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (group boycott of health
insurers by dentists); Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Soe'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum price
fixing by doctors); United States v. Alston, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,366 (D. Ariz. 1990) (price
fixing by three Tucson dentists). There are several such cases on the record. See also Motenko,
supra note 1, at 639 ("[W]e have had continued aggressive enforcement in the health care area.").
17. See, eg., United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 295 (1990).
18. See, eg., U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release No. 88-188 (May 25, 1988) (regarding pro-
posed hospital mergers in Roanoke, Virginia and Rockford, Illinois which the government
contested).
19. There are numerous public speeches on the record. For example, the current Chair of the
FTC, Janet Steiger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
Rick James, regularly speak at antitrust and health care seminars and bar association meetings
across the country. Every year Ms. Steiger, or her designee, speaks to the National Health Lawyers
Association at their annual February meeting regarding antitrust in the health care field. Mr. James'
two immediate predecessors-James Rill and Charles Rule-gave a speech each year while in office
at the annual meeting ofthe Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association. These officials often
address antitrust enforcement in the health care field in their public pronouncements.
20. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990) ("Every contract, combina-
tion.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.., is declared to be illegal.").
21. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (engineers); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (lawyers and other professionals). "The nature of an
occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act." Id. at 787. See
generally 6 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§§ 49.02[1][a], 52.0[1l] (1992).
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ways been somewhat comforted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 which
exempts certain insurance-related conduct from the federal antitrust
laws. Some insurance companies were surprised that they now had to
worry about their activities in the health care field. Yet, by the 1980s,
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to the federal antitrust laws provided
them only limited protection. For example, the statutory language of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act stated that the exemption applied only to the
"business of insurance."2 3 Judicial decisions clearly indicated that the
"business of insurance" was not synonymous with the "insurance busi-
ness."2 4 Therefore, an insurance company's activities are not automati-
cally exempt from the federal antitrust laws merely because they are
undertaken by an insurance company. Rather, only those arrangements
that involve spreading or transfering of risk or that implicate the rela-
tionship between the policyholder and the insurer qualify for protection
from the antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.25
Furthermore, under indemnity plans, most interactions of insurers in-
volve their insureds. As a result of this relationship, the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act would probably protect much of this activity from the federal
antitrust laws. In contrast, in the managed care setting, the insurer is
deeply involved in relationships with doctors, hospitals, outpatient sur-
gery centers, allied health professionals, and other health care providers.
22. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988); WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 1990
ANTrrRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 7.01[2]; 6 VON KALINOWSU, supra note 21, §§ 47.01-47.02. Con-
gress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 to protect both the insurance industry and, indi-
rectly, individual policyholders from the alleged destabilizing effects of the antitrust laws. It was
under a sustained attack in Congress at the time of writing this Article. Representative Jack Brooks
(D-Tex.) introduced a bill to substantially amend the McCarran-Ferguson Act ("Brooks bill") in the
102d Congress. H.R. 9, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). An earlier bill, identical to H.R. 9, was intro-
duced in the 101st Congress. H.R. 1663, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). The Brooks bill proposed to
significantly scale back the protections afforded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The insurance
industry and its supporting trade associations, including the American Insurance Association
("AIA"), the Health Insurance Association of America ("HIAA") and the American Council of
Life Insurers ("ACLI") disagree over the exact meaning of the language found in the Brooks bill.
Some consider it an outright repeal of the protections found in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, while
others believe that it leaves the insurance industry with a somewhat cryptic and insignificant level of
protection.
23. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1988). The Act's other principal require-
ments are that state law regulate the activity in question and that the activity must not constitute
"boycott, coercion or intimidation." Id. § 1013(b).
24. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 7.01[2]; 6 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, §§ 47.01-47.02;
see also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
25. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 7.01[2]; 6 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, §§ 47.01-47.02.
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Antitrust disputes arising from these relationships would probably not
qualify for McCarran-Ferguson protection since provider contracts are
service contracts not insurance contracts. Rather, the actual insurance
contract exists between the insurer/managed care plan and the cus-
tomer/enrollee. Consequently, it became apparent to many health insur-
ers that they were fully subject to the federal antitrust laws. Finally, the
federal government's heightened interest in applying the federal antitrust
laws to the health care industry set the stage for future investigations and
litigation.
C. Scope of Article: Antitrust Issues and Recommendations for
Reducing Risks
This Article discusses the antitrust issues commonly presented when
managed care companies interact with health care providers in con-
structing or reconfiguring their provider networks. The Article then ad-
vances several recommendations specifically designed to reduce the
antitrust risks in this area. In Section II, the Article briefly describes the
political and business dynamic that exists between managed care compa-
nies and doctors, hospitals, and other providers that are part of, or seek
to become part of, a provider network. Section III describes and ana-
lyzes the antitrust statutes and the case law implicated by provider net-
work decisions. This section explains the relevance and applicability of
the so-called terminated dealer cases to the health care industry and ana-
lyzes and describes behavior that may tend to prove the existence of an
implied agreement in restraint of trade.
Section IV examines an important and widely-discussed health care
case26 involving hospital provider networks in order to illustrate the prin-
ciples presented earlier in this Article and to underscore the steps neces-
sary to avoid antitrust violations and to reduce the risk of litigation. The
Article concludes with several recommendations designed to assist both
managed care companies and health care providers avoid antitrust liabil-
26. See infra notes 99-140 and accompanying text discussing the Reazin litigation. Members of
the health care industry widely followed and discussed the Reazin litigation. However, research
indicates that apart from news reports on the litigation at the federal district and appellate court
levels, academics wrote little scholarly commentary on the meaning and significance of the litigation.
To date, only one law review article has discussed Reazn. See Arnold Cenicker, A Competitive
Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts Between Health Care Providers and Insurers,
69 N.C. L. REv. 863, 876-79 (1991). Celnicker discusses Reazin as part of a larger analysis of most
favored nations contract clauses.
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ity for allegedly conspiring to exclude other providers from managed
care provider networks.
II. PROVIDER NETWORKS: THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN THE PLAYERS
Managed care plans are, in effect, large "purchasers" of health care
services offered by doctors, hospitals, and other health care professionals.
The American public rarely buys medical or health care services directly
from providers. Rather, managed care companies buy such services, add
an insurance component which spreads the risk and the potential costs of
serious illnesses, and then offer this combined product27 to the public.
Given their central role in the health care market, managed care plans
are often the target of intense pressure and lobbying from various provid-
ers and provider groups who jockey to do business with the health plan.
By necessity, some providers will be selected for inclusion in the network
and some will not. Depending upon the particular facts and the competi-
tive impact upon the provider in question, declination or termination de-
cisions may lead to litigation.
In addition to initially selecting providers for inclusion in their net-
works, managed care companies also periodically review and reconfigure
their networks in order to maintain adequate geographic and service cov-
erage28 for their membership. For an example of the need for adequate
geographic coverage, suppose an HMO successfully attains a new con-
tract to provide health insurance to the employees of a large employer.
The HMO would review the location of the employer's plant(s) and the
employees' residences and compare that data to the geographic location
of the doctors and hospitals in its network. If an inadequate geographic
overlap exists, that HMO must contract with additional providers lo-
cated near the employees in order to ensure coverage for all enrollees in
the health plan. Depending upon the patient flow at other network loca-
tions, the HMO may deem it fiscally prudent to terminate or refuse to
renew its contracts with some of the doctors currently in the network.
The terminated providers might conceivably file antitrust suits alleging
that their exclusion was the product of a boycott conspiracy between the
plan and some other party, usually another provider or group of
providers.
27. Industry insiders call the combined product "health care financing." Health care financing
differs from health care services which are offered by medical providers.
28. Service coverage means having the right mix of medical specialties represented in the net-
work in order to effectively address the medical needs of its members.
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As this Article discusses below, if a managed care company makes
decisions concerning the composition of its provider network unilaterally
and pursuant to objective guidelines, then it can overcome most, if not
all,29 antitrust challenges. Antitrust problems may arise, however, if a
managed care plan makes, or appears to make, a termination, declination
or non-renewal decision regarding a provider in response to an under-
standing with a third party3" such as a competing provider.
III. IMPLIED AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
A. Generally
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade.3 Illegal restraints of trade can take
numerous forms including price fixing, geographic or customer market
allocations, and boycotting.32 The language of section 1 clearly indicates,
29. A provider excluded or terminated from a given network by a managed care plan acting
unilaterally nonetheless may be able to sue successfully under the federal antitrust laws. In geo-
graphically remote areas sometimes only a single managed care plan exists. In this instance, the
plan's exclusion of a provider from its network may mean that the provider will suffer substantial
economic harm because patients in that geographic market will be steered toward other providers
who are members of the network. Antitrust analysis suggests that a provider-controlled plan might
be considered an "essential facility" for the providers in that location; if so, the plan would be
precluded from excluding them. See Health Care Committee Task Force on Preferred Provider Orga.
nizations, Who Gets In and P/ho Is Left Out: Group Boycotts and Essential Facilities, in MANAGED
CARE AND ANTrrRUST: THE PPO EXPERIENCE 39, 40-42, 53-56 (M. Elizabeth Gee & Phillip A.
Proger eds., 1990); see, eg., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985); see also HOLMES, supra note 22, § 2.06 (discussing the "essential facilities doctrine"). Other
managed care companies seeking to enter the market might also sue the health plan, regardless of
whether it is provider-controlled or not, if the provider contracts contain an exclusivity provision
that prohibits the network providers from signing contracts with any other private, third-party
payor. In that situation, a new market entrant might sue the health plan for monopolization under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (prohibit-
ing monopolization); see generally 3 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, §§ 7.00-9.00 (discussing
monopolization).
30. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). Copperweld and its
progeny would generally protect provider network decisions made in the name of the plan by a
managed care plan's provider relations or provider contracting officer from a Sherman Act § 1 con-
spiracy claim. In Copperweld, the United States Supreme Court held that a parent corporation
cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 777. In
dictum, the Supreme Court stated that "officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the
plurality of actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy." Id at 769. Therefore, a plaintiff or prosecutor
could not successfully assert that a conspiracy existed between a managed care company and its
employee in charge of provider contracting. For a discussion of the requirement of at least two
actors under § 1 of the Sherman Act, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
31. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990). See also supra note 20.
32. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 1; 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, § 6. Such antitrust
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inter alia, that at least two parties must enter into an agreement that
restrains trade in order for an antitrust violation to occur 3P-a party can-
not conspire or agree with itself to restrain trade.
Generally two types of agreements exist under the antitrust laws: ex-
press and implied agreements.3 Finding proof of express agreements
poses few problems. A contract between two sellers fixing the prices that
they each will charge is an example of an express contract to restrain
trade. Because they are so obvious, express contracts are rare. Most cor-
porations and experienced business managers are too sophisticated to
memorialize an illegal or legally questionable arrangement in writing.
Consequently, most agreements involved in antitrust suits take the form
of implied agreements. These agreements are tacit agreements and must
be proved by circumstantial evidence.35 Parties in antitrust litigation
often expend most of their time and effort attempting to prove or rebut
the alleged existence of an implied agreement. In determining the exist-
ence of an implied agreement, a court generally considers the following
factors:3
6
violations are per se illegal. 2 id. § 6.02(1]. Thus, if a court finds that such an agreement existed,
then the court must find an antitrust violation. The defendant's arguments concerning lack of intent,
lack of anti-competitive impact and the presence of pro-competitive benefits are irrelevant. See, eg.,
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "IThere are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. Courts analyze other
antitrust violations under the "rule of reason" which permits the defense to present these and other
arguments. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 1.04; 2 VON KALINOWSmI, supra note 21, § 6.02[2].
Although they have been traditionally analyzed under the per se standard, it is no longer entirely
settled what legal standard should apply to group boycotts. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held, in
part, that if a defendant possessed "market power or exclusive access to an element essential to
effective competition," then the per se standard applied. Of course, an inquiry into market power is
one of the hallmarks of the rule of reason test Thus, in a de facto sense, the court advocated a
truncated rule of reason test for the group boycott in question.
33. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 1.031]; 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, § 6.01[2] (prov-
ing such an agreement requires a showing of "two or more legally independent actors . . . who
engage in concerted action"); see also Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911,
914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) ("It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you
must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself
any more than a private individual can.").
34. See HOLMES, supra note 22, § 1.031]; 2 vON KALINowsI, supra note 21, § 3.02[2] ("The
concerted action may be demonstrated by an express agreement or it inay be inferred by the
courts."); § 6.01[3] ("concerted action may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence").
35. 2 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 21, §§ 3.02(2], 6.01[3].
36. Id.; see infra notes 38-53, 81-98 and accompanying text. At one time, the federal judiciary
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(1) The course of dealing between the parties, including oral and writ-
ten communications, the dynamics of the relationship, historic methods
of doing business, etc.;
(2) whether an opportunity to conspire existed (e.g., attendance at a
common meeting);
(3) parallel or other conduct in the marketplace suggesting a conspir-
acy, including conduct that would be considered economically irrational
but for the existence of a conspiracy;
(4) whether an economic motive to engage in an alleged conspiracy
was present; and
(5) whether other, plausible explanations exist for the parties' appar-
ent anti-competitive conduct.
No single factor is dispositive of the concerted action analysis. For
example, proving that two competitors attended the same trade associa-
tion meeting that gave them an opportunity to conspire will not by itself
prove the existence of a tacit conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws.
Similarly, parallel behavior by two or more competitors in the market-
place, without more, does not conclusively prove the existence of a con-
spiracy since such behavior may be the product of business decisions
reached independently by the parties.37 Several factors tending to prove
the existence of a tacit conspiracy are required before a court will con-
clude that an implied conspiracy or agreement exists.
B. The Matsushita and Monsanto Decisions
In 1986 in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,38
the United States Supreme Court issued its most recent articulation of
the standard for determining whether an implied agreement exists.39 The
opinion illustrates, in particular, the fourth factor listed above-whether
there was an economic motive to engage in an alleged conspiracy. In
did not ordinarily engage in such an extensive analysis. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying
text.
37. See, e.g., Theatre Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); see gener-
ally HOLMES, supra note 22, § 1.03[3]; 2 VON KALINOWSm, supra note 21, § 6-18 to 6-23.
38. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
39. This Article does not introduce or discuss the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Business
Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). In Sharp, the Court held that an agreement
between a calculator supplier and dealer to terminate another dealer did not constitute per se price
fixing absent an agreement on specific prices or price levels. Sharp was a decision regarding vertical
price fixing which did not break new ground in the area of implied agreements; therefore, this Article
does not discuss it.
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Matsushita, American television manufacturers brought suit under the
Sherman Act, claiming that a group of twenty-one Japanese electronics
manufacturers had conspired for over twenty years to drive the Ameri-
can corporations out of business through predatory pricing techniques.' °
Super-competitive prices in Japan allegedly subsidized the predatorily
low price of Japanese electronics products in the United States.4 The
Court concluded that the alleged conspiracy did not exist and conse-
quently found that the Japanese manufacturers did not violate the anti-
trust laws.42
The Japanese manufacturers' economic interests and motives were
central to the Court's analysis.43 In order to price predatorily, the Japa-
nese would have had to forgo substantial profits from their sales in the
United States for over twenty years.' Furthermore, "[f]or the invest-
ment to be rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation
of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses
suffered."'45 At best, such a predatory conspiracy would have a minimal
chance of success.4 6 In addition, considering that in those twenty years
the Japanese had not yet succeeded in driving the American companies
from the U.S. electronics market,47 any intent to conspire would have
been economically irrational.48 Because the alleged predatory pricing
would have been economically unreasonable, the Court concluded that
the Japanese lacked motive to engage in such a conspiracy; consequently,
40. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 597.
43. Id. at 588-93.
44. Id. at 591-93.
45. Id. at 588-89.
46. Id. at 590. The Court stated:
Such a conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous plan under-
taken by a single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to be sustained during
the conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any gains to be realized from its success.
Precisely because success is speculative and depends on a willingness to endure losses for
an indefinite period, each conspirator has strong incentive to cheat .... The necessary
allocation is therefore difficult to accomplish.
Id.
47. Id. at 591 ("Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have commenced, petitioners
appear to be far from achieving this goal.").
48. Id. at 587. The Court concluded that the petitioner had no economic incentive to join the
conspiracy. Id. Indeed, the Court went further to conclude that the petitioner "had every incentive
not to engage in the conduct with which they are charged." Id. at 588.
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the Court found that no conspiracy existed.4 9
The Matsushita Court articulated the standard that plaintiffs must sat-
isfy in order to survive summary judgment when attempting to prove an
implied agreement in violation of the antitrust laws. The Court stated:
"[I]f the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than
would otherwise be necessary."50 The Court relied upon the standard
concerning implied agreements that it previously adopted in an earlier
antitrust case, Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 51
[I]n Monsanto ... we held that conduct as consistent with permissible com-
petition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an in-
ference of antitrust conspiracy .... To survive a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a viola-
tion of [section] 1 [of the Sherman Act] must present evidence 'that tends to
exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted indepen-
dently.... Respondents in this case, in other words, must show that the
inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed
respondents.52
As Matsushita and Monsanto illustrate, the test for determining
whether conduct is unilateral or undertaken pursuant to a tacit conspir-
acy or implied agreement with another party is highly fact specific. The
verbal standards used by the Supreme Court in Monsanto and Matsu-
shita can go only so far in assisting antitrust lawyers in specific counsel-
ing situations or in aiding courts in determining whether an implied
agreement exists. Attorneys and courts are left to rely on the list of fac-
tors discussed above and the general principle that, as always, the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proof, especially in antitrust cases where an
erroneous charge and conviction may result in deterring "perfectly legiti-
mate conduct."53
49. Id. at 592 ("The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its
asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist.").
50. Id. at 587.
51. 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). The Monsanto Court held that the mere receipt of complaints
from dealers concerning the conduct of another dealer was not, in itself, sufficient to establish a
conspiracy. Id. Here, however, the Supreme Court also found evidence "tending to exclude the
possibility" of merely unilateral action. Id.
52. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574, 588 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
53. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
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C. The Relevance of the Terminated Dealer Cases
L The Similarities Between Manufacturers and Dealers and
Managed Care Companies and Providers
Antitrust cases specifically addressing the relationship between man-
aged care plans and their provider networks are almost nonexistent.5 4
Although antitrust risks in this area appear to be significant, they have
yet to manifest themselves in either extensive case law"5 or written com-
mentary.56 A lawyer, academician, or judge with interest in this area
must analogize between provider networks and the facts found in certain
non-health care cases. But which antitrust opinions are relevant?
This Article maintains that the dealer termination cases 7 and the rela-
tionship between manufacturers and dealers presented and discussed in
those cases most closely approximate the relationship between managed
care plans and providers. It is reasonable to view managed care compa-
nies as manufacturers" and the individual providers as the dealers who
stand on the front lines dealing face to face with the customers. Manu-
54. Reazin is the only case directly on point. See infra notes 99-140 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 99-140 and accompanying text.
56. Research uncovered no law review articles that squarely discussed and addressed the anti-
trust issues presented by provider networks and the selection process undertaken by managed care
companies in creating those networks. The whole concept of managed care and the application of
the antitrust laws to managed care is still fairly novel. Academic commentators have not yet grap-
pled with many of the antitrust issues presented by the new relationships found today in the health
care field. This Article was written, in part, in the hope that others will subsequently contribute to
the literature.
57. See generally HOLMES, supra note 22, §§ 1.03[2], 1.09[2].
58. Section II of this Article analogizes managed care plans to "purchasers" of health care
services offered by providers. Here, this Article states that one should view managed care plans as
standing in the shoes of a manufacturer. There is no inconsistency in these two assertions although
at first blush, it may seem otherwise. Both points of view assume that managed care plans and
providers stand in a vertical relationship with one another. In addition, the first statement is cer-
tainly true in an economic sense. Managed care plans do indeed "purchase" medical services from
providers since they bargain for volume discounts with respect to a variety of medical treatments and
procedures. Furthermore, there are a few judicial opinions that generally view insurance companies
as "purchasers." See, eg., Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 600 F.2d (7th Cir. 1981);
Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of California, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 63,885 (N.D. Cal.
1981), affld 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1982). However, for purposes of analyzing provider network
decisions in particular under the antitrust laws, managed care plans are most logically viewed as
manufacturers. These plans generally dictate the parameters of the relationship with providers and
determine on what basis the health insurance product will be offered to the public. The "product"-
known in the industry as "health care financing" which is a combination of the medical services
rendered by a provider and the insurance or risk spreading component contributed by the plan-is
offered to the public at the provider's place of business. The doctor's office or hospital operating
room is analogous to a dealer showroom for purposes of antitrust analysis. Using the automotive
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facturers maintain dealership agreements to facilitate the sale of their
goods or services. Manufacturers commonly compile an approved list of
dealers authorized to do business on their behalf. Similarly, managed
care companies maintain a network of providers through which they do
business. Consequently, manufacturers and managed care plans often
have the same problems in their relationships with dealers or, in the
health care context, with providers. Dealers/providers without contracts
often lobby to gain admission to the network. Sometimes deal-
ers/providers will badmouth other dealers/providers or will lobby the
manufacturer/managed care company to cease doing business with an-
other dealer/provider. Because the dealer/provider level of competition
is important in facilitating the sale of the products or services, the manu-
facturer/managed care plan maintains regular contact with the
dealer/provider regarding, inter alia, the state of sales, the reception of
the product or service by the public, and the success of promotional
schemes.
2 The Terminated Dealer Cases
According to the "Colgate doctrine," announced by the Supreme
Court in 1919 in United States v. Colgate,59 a participant in the economic
marketplace has the right under section 1 of the Sherman Act to "exer-
cise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal."'  Accordingly, a seller or manufacturer has the right to make uni-
lateral decisions regarding the retailers or dealers with whom it will
transact business free from antitrust liability. The challenge lies in deter-
mining whether the manufacturer unilaterally reached the contracting
industry as an example, a managed care company stands in the shoes of General Motors and the
providers are akin to the local GM dealers.
Those involved in the health care industry often refer to "third party payors"-managed care
companies-that act as "purchasers" of medical services from providers. However, upon engaging
in an extended antitrust analysis of provider network decisions, the only antitrust paradigm that has
conceptual integrity involves viewing the managed care companies as manufacturers and the provid-
ers as dealers. Some antitrust health care opinions ignore the significance of this relationship and
thereby needlessly complicate the jobs of both judges and practitioners who must apply antitrust law
to this non-traditional industry. This Article finds external support for this paradigm from the
Tenth Circuit's brief passing reference to it. See Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 965. In Reazin III, the
court casually noted that "[t]his case does not involve only... the termination of a vertical relation.
ship akin to a dealer termination." The case involved a third-party payor's termination of a hospital.
Clearly, the Tenth Circuit viewed the parties' relationship in the same manner as this Article
suggests.
59. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
60. Id. at 307.
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decisions or whether such decisions were the product of a conspiracy
with a third party or parties. Nonunilateral contracting decisions which
are the product of a conspiracy may be subject to attack under section 1
of the Sherman Act.61
Antitrust suits alleging that such business decisions are the result of an
illegal conspiracy may be styled in several ways. An antitrust suit may
allege a conspiracy to boycott the victimized dealer,62 a conspiracy to fix
prices by terminating those dealers that do not adhere to a resale price
maintenance scheme,6 a or a conspiracy to divide the market either along
customer or geographic lines by terminating or excluding those dealers
who do not obey restrictive guidelines regarding the sale of the manufac-
turer's product. 6 Regardless of the type of section 1 claim alleged, the
critical component is the existence of some form of agreement among the
conspirators. Express or implied agreements are the factual predicate of
all Sherman Act section 1 suits, since the Act requires proof of con-
certed, not unilateral, action. Despite the different kinds of violations
that might be alleged, the quintessential suit in the terminated dealer
context is a suit alleging an illegal boycott.
a. Early Cases: A Rigid Approach Toward the Concerted Action
Requirement
In the early manufacturer-dealer cases, courts applied a rigid frame-
work when they interpreted implied agreements. 65 The courts used a
fairly low threshold for finding such tacit conspiracies. They often found
them based upon communications between the alleged co-conspirators.
These communications may in fact have been conducted for perfectly
legitimate business reasons. The Supreme Court's decisions in Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores 66 and United States v. General Motors67
61. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
62. See, eg., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-47 (1966) (finding
manufacturer-dealer conspiracy due to manufacturer's grudging acquiescence to a boycott scheme);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (finding supplier-dealer conspiracy to
boycott another dealer).
63. See, eg., Monsanto, 465 U.S. 752, 755-56 (vertical price fixing conspiracy between herbi-
cide manufacturer and dealer); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982) (vertical price
fixing); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979) (horizontal price
fixing); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (vertical price fixing).
64. See, e-g., Purity Prod., Inc. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 564 (D. Md. 1988)
(dealer refused to stay within assigned territory and was terminated).
65. See HOLMES supra note 22, § 1.03[2].
66. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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illustrate this rigid approach.
In Klor's, the defendant, a retail drug store, was concerned over the
price-cutting practices of a competitor, which had similar suppliers.68 In
an effort to stop this practice, the defendant retailer contacted the suppli-
ers and attempted to induce them to stop supplying the price-cutter.69
The suppliers apparently did not communicate with one another directly.
Rather, the defendant retailer engaged in a series of separate communica-
tions with each supplier.7" The Supreme Court nonetheless found a tacit
conspiracy among the suppliers to boycott the price-cutting retailer.71
The Court did not inquire into alternative motives for the suppliers' con-
duct or analyze evidence that would have tended to exclude the possibil-
ity of an implied agreement among the parties to boycott the price-
cutting retailer.7 2
The Supreme Court's 1966 decision in United States v. General Mo-
tors7 further illustrates the relatively low threshold that existed for find-
ing illegal implied agreements among manufacturers and dealers. In
General Motors, a group of General Motors ("GM") dealers in Los An-
geles coordinated their efforts against other GM dealers who were selling
automobiles to price-cutting independent retailers.74 The defendant deal-
ers contacted GM as a group and used their collective power to pressure
GM to convince the other group of dealers to stop supplying the price-
cutters.7  GM reluctantly participated in the scheme76 due to the pres-
67. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
68. These included General Electric, RCA, Admiral, Zenith, and Emerson. See Klor's, 359
U.S. at 208.
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 212. The Supreme Court concluded that "the allegations of [the] complaint dis-
close[d] ... a boycott." Id. Consequently, the Court reversed the federal appellate court's decision
to grant summary judgment for the defendant. Id. Remanding the case in the belief that a group
boycott had occurred, the Court noted that the allegations involved "a wide combination consisting
of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer." Id. at 213.
72. Id. at 210-13.
73. 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See generally Joe Sims & Phillip A. Proger, Pricing Issues in Dealer
and Franchise Relationships: Litigation Issues in Dealer Termination Cases, 60 ANTITRusT L.J. 465,
468-70 (1991).
74. The complaining dealers organized a letter-writing campaign directed at GM, met with
GM's regional personnel, and discussed possible collective action at their local trade-group meetings.
After GM warned the offending dealers to stop selling automobiles (specifically Chevrolets) to the
price-cutters, the complaining dealers jointly began to police and enforce the sales restraint. GM,
384 U.S. at 133-34.
75. Id
76. The dealers first complained and demanded action from GM's regional manager, Robert
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sure asserted by this relatively large and powerful group of GM dealers.77
GM feared that to do otherwise would have constituted economic suicide
for its products in Los Angeles County. Nonetheless, in a civil suit
brought by the federal government, the Supreme Court held GM liable
as a co-conspirator.78
The Supreme Court again clearly indicated that it was not interested in
engaging in a detailed facts and circumstances type of analysis when ana-
lyzing implied agreements. If the alleged conspirators (manufacturers
and dealers) had communicated and termination or some type of exclu-
sionary behavior followed, then the Court concluded that an implied
agreement in violation of the antitrust laws existed. This analytical ap-
proach toward the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act created dangerous consequences for manufacturers and dealers.
These parties regularly interact with one another for a variety of reasons
within the ordinary scope of business.79 The fact that these interactions
might form the basis of an antitrust suit represented a real and ongoing
legal danger.
b. Recent Case Law: A Comprehensive Approach Toward the
Concerted Action Requirement
Since the General Motors case, the federal judiciary has adopted a
more comprehensive approach toward analyzing implied agreements.8 0
Under this approach the courts acknowledge the fact that manufacturers
and dealers regularly interact with one another for legitimate economic
and business reasons. More recently, the federal judiciary has considered
alternative explanations for the conduct of sellers or manufacturers ac-
cused of participating in illegal conspiracies to terminate or otherwise
exclude the plaintiff. Consequently, manufacturers or sellers who have
terminated, declined to sign, or refused to renew dealership agreements
O'Connor. The dealers confronted O'Connor with "evidence that some dealers were doing business
with the discounters and asked for his assistance." O'Connor "promised he would speak to the
offending dealers," but neglected to take action on the complaining dealers' behalf. Id. at 133. Tak-
ing matters into their own hands, some of the complaining dealers spoke directly to those dealers
who were supplying the price cutters. Id.
77. Members of three dealer trade associations complained directly to GM's headquarters in
Detroit, Michigan. Id. at 134. "Hundreds of the letters and wires descended upon Detroit," demon-
strating the power of the complaining dealers. Id at 134.
78. Id at 141-42.
79. Such communications may concern inventory, prices, various non-price supports such as
advertising campaigns, the public's reaction to a particular product, and the design of new products.
80. See infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
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have been able to advance legitimate explanations for the decisions which
the plaintiff alleged resulted from a tacit conspiracy. The opportunity to
present such evidence provides defendants with a greater chance of pre-
vailing in a section 1 Sherman Act lawsuit.
/ Monsanto Company v. Spray-Rite Service Corporation
In Monsanto,"1 the Supreme Court adopted a more flexible approach
toward the issue of concerted action. The Court assumed that actual
communication existed between the defendant manufacturer, Monsanto
Company, and the distributors who allegedly participated in the conspir-
acy. 2 Previously, the Court probably would have considered this inter-
action sufficient evidence to prove the existence of an unlawful implied
agreement between Monsanto and the surviving distributors.8 3 In Mon-
santo, however, the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the surround-
ing facts and circumstances in order to determine as accurately as
possible whether Monsanto's decision to cease its commercial relation-
ship with the plaintiff distributor was the product of a conspiracy or a
unilateral business decision.8 4
The Court held, inter alia, the fact that the surviving distributors com-
plained to the manufacturer about the pricing practices of the terminated
distributor prior to termination was not, in itself, sufficient to prove the
existence of a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws."5 The Court
reasoned that "[permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the
existence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination came
about 'in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize perfectly legiti-
mate conduct." 6 "[S]omething more than evidence of complaints" is
81. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). See supra note 51; see generally Sims & Proger, supra note 73, at 465.
66.
82. 465 U.S. at 765. The Court stated:
mhe fact that a manufacturer and its distributors are in constant communication about
prices and marketing strategy does not alone show that the distributors are not making
independent pricing decisions. A manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons
to exchange information about the prices and the reception of their products in the market.
Id. at 762.
83. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
84. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765-68. The terminated distributor styled its complaint as a
conspiracy to fix resale prices, alleging that Monsanto had terminated its relationship with the plain-
tiff because it failed to adhere to the conspirators' recommended price guidelines. Id.
85. Id. at 764.
86. Id. at 763.
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necessary before finding a Sherman Act violation.87 In determining what
more is required, the Court articulated the requisite standard of proof for
implied agreements:
There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manu-
facturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently....
[T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence
that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others "had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlaw-
ful objective." 88
Even after applying the more flexible standard, the Court still found that
the defendant violated the Sherman Act, in large part due to a newsletter
that purported to summarize a meeting between the defendant manufac-
turer and the distributor who wrote the newsletter. The newsletter de-
scribed Monsanto's efforts to work with distributors to collectively
maintain resale prices above a certain level and alluded to Monsanto's
intent to terminate its relationship with those distributors who did not
maintain prices in the manner suggested.89 The existence of the newslet-
ter, and the portrait of collective action that it conveyed, undercut Mon-
santo's argument that it had reached its decision unilaterally pursuant to
objective criteria.'
iL Other Cases
Monsanto represented a watershed in the Supreme Court's approach
toward the concerted action requirement and implied agreements in re-
straint of trade. The Court considered economic and business factors in
87. Id. The Court noted, however, that evidence of complaints contains some probative value.
Id. at 764 n.8.
88. Id. at 764. (quoting Edward L. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
89. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765-66.
90. Id. at 765-68. Prior to terminating the plaintiff, Monsanto publicly articulated a set of
criteria that it asserted it would use when determining the renewal of distributorship contracts.
These criteria included:
(i) whether the distributor's primary activity was soliciting sales to retail dealers;
(ii) whether the distributor employed trained salesmen capable of educating its customers
on the technical aspects of Monsanto's herbicides; and (iii) whether the distributor could
be expected "to exploit fully" the market in its geographic area of primary responsibility.
Id. at 756.
Unfortunately for Monsanto, the company failed to apply its criteria. The Court heard "reliable
testimony" that Monsanto did not discuss these criteria with the plaintiff prior to its decision. Id. at
767-68. Furthermore, evidence showed that Monsanto representatives made several statements to
the plaintiff indicating that Monsanto wanted to terminate it because of its unwillingness to raise its
prices in accordance with the conspirators' wishes. Id. at 767-68.
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attempting to understand the reasons for the parties' behavior in its de-
termination of whether an illegal implied agreement between the parties
existed. Several lower courts have subsequently followed the Court's
more flexible approach.
For example, in HL. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Systems,91 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that defend-
ants, Siemens Medical Systems and other dealers, did not engage in an
illegal conspiracy to boycott the plaintiff,92 H.L. Hayden Co.93 The Sec-
ond Circuit found no violation of the antitrust laws despite evidence that
the manufacturer, Siemens Medical Systems, terminated the plaintiff af-
ter receiving complaints from other dealers.94 These dealers complained
about the plaintiff because the plaintiff frequently resold the product in
question to mail-order outlets which offered the good for a cheaper price.
The Second Circuit concluded that the manufacturer's decision to termi-
nate its relationship with the plaintiff was the result of its own unilateral
business judgment and was essentially grounded upon the manufacturer's
concern that sales through mail-order outlets would harm its commercial
image.9
5
Business reasons advanced by defendants to justify their conduct in
terminated dealer cases Vary as much as the defendants' businesses them-
91. 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 68,622 (2d Cir. 1989).
92. The other plaintiff, Schein Dental, sold dental equipment through mail-order catalogs. Id.
1 61,279. In addition to owning and founding Schein Dental, Marvin Schein owned a 50% interest
in Hayden. Id. Siemens purportedly decided to terminate Hayden's dealership agreement because
of Hayden's practice of selling Siemens dental equipment to Schein Dental which then offered it to
the public through mail-order catalogs. Id. 1 61,278-80, 61,282-85.
93. See id. 44 61,282-85. The Second Circuit relied upon the standards that the Supreme Court
articulated in Monsanto, see supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text, and Matsushita, see supra
notes 38-53 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit noted that Siemens interacted with the
surviving dealers on several occasions and, therefore, had opportunity to conspire with them. On the
other hand, the court carefully weighed the defendant's argument that it was concerned about its
reputation for quality in the marketplace and that it had made a unilateral decision to terminate
Hayden because of Hayden's sales of Siemens-manufactured products to a mail-order outlet. The
defendant claimed that it considered itself the "'Mercedes' of the dental x-ray market." Id. t
61,279. The defendant contended that the mail-order sales undermined this image of quality. Id. 11
61,278-80, 61,282-85. Applying the Supreme Court's standards established in Monsanto and Matsu-
shita, the Second Circuit found that evidence consistent with both a conspiracy and with unilateral
action was not sufficient to prove the existence of an agreement to boycott Hayden. Id.
94. Id. Given the Supreme Court's decisions in both Monsanto and Matsushita, the appellate
court knew that pre-termination discussions or complaints among the manufacturer and the surviv-
ing dealers about the soon-to-be-terminated dealer are not sufficient to prove the existence of a tacit
conspiracy to boycott the terminated dealer.
95. Id. 4J 61,282-85.
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selves. Courts have dismissed antitrust suits against manufacturers and
suppliers when they have found that the defendants terminated their re-
lationship with the plaintiffs due to the plaintiffs' bad credit history,96
poor performance, 97 or as part of a fundamental business restructuring.9"
IV. PROVIDER NETWORK SELECTION DECISIONS: ANTITRUST
RISKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts have utilized the comprehensive analysis explained and dis-
cussed above when analyzing alleged antitrust conspiracies within the
health care industry. In Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield (Reazin
11) 99 and in Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield (Reazin 1 1 1),1" the
United Stated District Court for the District of Kansas and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, respectively, addressed the
concerted action requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act and the
issue of implied agreements in the provider network context. 10 1
A. The Reazin Case
The dispute addressed in Reazin II and Reazin III arose when Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas ("Blue Cross") terminated its provider
contract with Wesley Hospital ("Wesley"). 102 Wesley, and the other
plaintiffs involved in the suit, 03 alleged that Blue Cross did not take this
96. See, eg., Joe Requeira, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1981);
Schaben v. Samuel Moore & Co., 606 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1979).
97. See, eg., Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1988); Chandler
Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1980).
98. See, e.g., Odishelidze v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 853 F.2d 21 (st Cir. 1988) (holding
that an insurance company's decision to replace independent agents with in-house agents was a
unilateral action and not an illegal boycott).
99. 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987).
100. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Given their identity of facts and similar legal conclusion, this Article analyzes these two
opinions collectively.
102. Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 954-55.
103. In addition to Wesley Hospital, the plaintiffs included Dr. Walter Reazin, Health Care Plus
and New Century Life Insurance Company. Dr. Reazin's involvement in the litigation primarily
resulted from Blue Cross' counterclaims against Wesley, Dr. Reazin and others after the filing of the
original antitrust suit. Dr. Reazin was a member of a physician provider group (commonly called an
independent physician association or "IPA") that had allegedly conspired to avoid doing business
with Blue Cross' HMO which subsequently led to the HMO's demise. Blue Cross ultimately lost on
all its counterclaims. Id. at 979-83; 663 F. Supp. at 1385. Health Care Plus was an HMO and New
Century Life Insurance Company was a life insurer owned by Wesley's parent company, the Hospi-
tal Corporation of America. Id. at 1377-78.
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action unilaterally but, rather, conspired with two other hospitals in the
market area, Saint Joseph Hospital ("St. Joseph") and Saint Francis Hos-
pital ("St. Francis") (collectively, the "Saints") to boycott Wesley."
The Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA") purchased Wesley in
November 1984, shortly prior to Wesley's termination by Blue Cross.10 5
Through its subsidiaries, HCA was active in the medical services, health
care financing, and hospital management businesses. 106 HCA was Blue
Cross' competitor in the health care financing market through Health
Care Plus ("HCP"), an HMO that it had purchased in 1985.107 Blue
Cross offered three products in the health care financing market: (1) in-
demnity insurance; (2) a PPO called Choice Care; and (3) an HMO
known as HMO Kansas, Inc. ("HMOK"). °8 Wesley alleged that Blue
Cross had terminated it in order to discourage other Blue Cross provid-
ers from expanding into the health care financing market as Wesley had
done through its voluntary acquisition by HCA.1° Accordingly, the
plaintiffs also added a Sherman Act section 2110 claim, alleging that Blue
Cross had "monopolized, attempted to monopolize, and/or conspired to
monopolize the market for health care financing" by punishing those
who dared to enter the market in competition with Blue Cross.111 Fi-
nally, the plaintiffs also included a state law business tort claim:1 2 tor-
tious interference with prospective advantage.11 3
The jury in the federal district court returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs with respect to both the antitrust and business tort claims.1 14
After numerous post-trial motions, the federal district court entered
104. See Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 954-55.
105. See Reazin II, 663 F. Supp. at 1377.
106. Id at 1373.
107. Id at 1378.
108. Id. at 1372.
109. See Reazin 111, 899 F.2d at 954 ("Plaintiffs' theory was that Blue Cross, alarmed by a
perceived competitive threat from... HCA through its acquisitions of... Wesley ... HCP ... and
New Century... determined to 'hurt' Wesley and thereby send a message to other hospitals not to
do business with entities Blue Cross believed were competitors.").
110. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
111. Reazin 1II, 899 F.2d at 955.
112. Plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits often allege common law business tort claims.
113. Reazin 1II, 899 F.2d at 955-56. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant tortiously interfered
with their present and prospective business relations. Id.
114. Id at 955. The federal district court found that Blue Cross violated § 1 of the Sherman Act
by engaging in a conspiracy to restrain trade and violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing
the market. Id. Finally, the district court held that Blue Cross tortiously interfered with plaintiffs'
business relationships. Id.
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judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and granted their motion for summary
judgment on the defendant's counterclaim.115 Blue Cross appealed this
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.' 16
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the defend-
ant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a directed
verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial.117 The appellate court found
that many meetings and interactions between the Saints and Blue Cross
had occurred prior to the time when the Executive Committee of Blue
Cross' Board of Directors decided in August 1985 to terminate Wesley
effective upon the expiration of that calendar year."' Although the par-
ties presented conflicting testimony, these prior interactions between
Blue Cross and the Saints were undisputed.1 19 Rather, the debate cen-
tered around the character and motivation for these interactions. 120 The
court was forced to determine whether Blue Cross had decided unilater-
ally to drop Wesley from its hospital provider network; and if so, why
Blue Cross had communicated beforehand with the Saints in the first
place.
Blue Cross presented evidence that its discussions with the Saints fo-
cused only on the provision of hospital services to customers of Blue
Cross' HMO, HMOK.121 Blue Cross claimed that it was concerned
about the competitive standing of HMOK, and that it had a genuine and
legitimate interest in discussing contract issues with these two hospitals.
Both courts noted that such meetings presented an "existing forum" to
conspire. 22 However, proof of a mere opportunity to conspire, without
more, is not sufficient to prove that an implied agreement among the
parties existed in violation of the antitrust laws. Rather, as the Tenth
115. Id. at 956.
116. Id.
117. Id at 959.
118. Id. at 963. During the spring and summer of 1985, Blue Cross and the Saints held a series
of meetings. The district court found that the parties held a total of 27 meetings with one another.
Reazin 11, 663 F. Supp. at 1422.
119. Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 963. "The evidence and testimony concerning the precise circum-
stances under which the Saints accepted the reduced maximum allowable payments" from Blue
Cross "and learned of the proposed Wesley termination were conflicting." Id. See also Reazin 11,
663 F. Supp. at 1423. However, these "discussions ... eventually did take place." Reazin III, 899
F.2d at 962; see Reazin II, 663 F. Supp. at 1423. Despite the "conflicting testimony," the district
court found that "a meeting of the minds" regarding "the essential elements of the unlawful scheme"
occurred. Reazin II, 663 F. Supp. at 1423.
120. Reazin HI, 663 F. Supp. at 1421-24; see Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 963-64.
121. Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 963-64; Reazn II, 663 F. Supp. at 1421-24.
122. Reazin 11, 663 F. Supp. at 1422; Reazin 11I, 899 F.2d at 963.
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Circuit acknowledged, evidence must exist "'that tends to exclude the
possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently." '23 The
court noted that sufficient evidence must exist to support "a finding of 'a
conscious commitment to a common scheme.' ,124
The defendant's characterization of the prior communications as inno-
cent discussions concerning Blue Cross' HMO threatened to undercut
the plaintiffs' attempts to use these discussions as circumstantial evidence
of a conspiracy to boycott Wesley. Other evidence, however, painted a
significantly different picture of the interactions between Blue Cross and
the Saints. Testimony indicated that Blue Cross and the Saints had dis-
cussed Wesley's termination in conjunction with a reduction in the maxi-
mum allowable payments ("MAPs") for various hospital-based medical
services. 12  Blue Cross paid its hospitals based on these MAPs. The
Saints entertained the idea of accepting a MAP reduction if Blue Cross
terminated Wesley.' 2 6 The parties reasoned that if Blue Cross termi-
nated Wesley, the Saints would experience an increase in patient volume,
rendering the MAP reduction economically worthwhile. 127
Furthermore, documentary evidence strongly suggested that a tacit
conspiracy existed between Blue Cross and the Saints to boycott Wesley.
A memorandum from the Chief Financial Officer of St. Francis to the
Chief Executive Officer of St. Joseph noted that St. Francis and St. Jo-
seph "'were working with Blue Cross on various options that would al-
low Blue Cross to cancel Wesley's Blue Cross contract.' 2)128 The
memorandum discussed the reduction in MAPs that the two hospitals
would agree to if Wesley was terminated. 129 Finally, the Chief Financial
123. Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 963 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 and Monsanto, 465 U.S.
at 764). For a discussion of these two Supreme Court decisions and the judicial standards that they
applied, see supra notes 38-53, 81-90 and accompanying text.
124. Reazin Ii, 899 F.2d at 964 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764; Edward J. Sweeney &
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). See
supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
125. See Reazin 1I, 663 F. Supp. at 1421-24; Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 963-64. The Senior Vice
President of Blue Cross, among others, testified that the decision to terminate Wesley and the deci-
sion to seek reduced MAPs from the Saints were "related." Id. Written evidence was also sugges-
tive of an actual boycott. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
126. The Tenth Circuit noted the existence of "abundant evidence that the only reason the Saints
agreed to the reduced [MAPs] ... was because they anticipated a shift of patients from Wesley to the
Saints as a result of the termination of Wesley's contracting provider agreement." Reazin III, 899
F.2d at 964 n.18.
127. Id.
128. Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 964; Reazin II, 663 F. Supp. at 1422.
129. See Reazin III, 899 F.2d at 964; Reaz II, 663 F. Supp. at 1422.
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Officer of St. Francis referred outright to the "Wesley Boycott" which
involved a reduction in MAPs in return for the termination of Wesley.130
In addition, Wayne Johnston, the President of Blue Cross, wrote an
internal memorandum entitled "Questions About Not Contracting With
Wesley (HCA)" 131 that referred to the possible shift of patients based on
the reduction in MAPs.1 32 Johnston's memorandum also explicitly re-
ferred to possible antitrust concerns raised by their conduct and the need
to develop a legitimate rationale for those actions:
While it appears we can be selective in which hospitals we contract with
and not be guilty of anti-trust violations, Wesley will undoubtedly seek pub-
lic sympathy by contending they have been arbitrarily singled out by us.
They will contend we should cancel contracts with hospitals that have any
type of competitive program (St. Francis' PPO; Aetna PPO hospitals;
Doorth C. Kombs Development of TPA with St. Francis and any hospital
joining the VHA arrangement with Aetna[).] Will the public agree with
Wesley's contention or can we develop a sound rationale that the public will
accept that Wesley/HCA is different and our action is in the public
interest[?] 33
The memorandum demonstrated that the arrangement raised antitrust
concerns for Blue Cross without fully allaying those concerns. In fact,
this document confirmed the essence of the plaintiffs' theory that Blue
Cross and the Saints had conspired to boycott Wesley in violation of the
antitrust laws. Johnston expressed concern that Wesley would accuse
Blue Cross of taking action against the hospital because it had an affilia-
tion that placed it in competition with Blue Cross. 134 Instead of stating
why this was not the case, the memorandum discussed the need to de-
velop a legitimate rationale to give the situation a positive spin. 135 Men-
tioning the need to develop a legitimate rationale implies that one did not
exist. Instead of benefitting Blue Cross, the memorandum ultimately
hurt the company because it implied that Blue Cross was privately con-
cerned about an antitrust violation and was attempting to manufacture a
false explanation for its conduct. The written evidence and oral testi-
130. Reazin Ii, 899 F.2d at 964; Reazin II, 663 F. Supp. at 1422. While legal characterizations
of business personnel are certainly not dispositive of the legal status of a given arrangement, the
reference to a "Wesley Boycott" provided insight into the way in which the parties viewed their own
conduct and constituted damaging evidence against Blue Cross.
131. Reazin 11, 663 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
132. See id. at 1423.
133. Id. at 1423.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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mony convinced both the federal district court and federal appellate
court that an agreement between Blue Cross and the Saints existed.
Blue Cross tried to escape the strictures of the antitrust laws by argu-
ing, inter alia, that the Blue Cross employees who engaged in the discus-
sions with the Saints did not have the authority to commit Blue Cross to
the conspiracy.136 Therefore, Blue Cross asserted that it was not respon-
sible for violating the antitrust laws.137 The district court concluded,
based upon agency law principles, that Blue Cross was liable for the con-
duct of its employee-agents and that, at most, the company could take
action against these senior staff members for malfeasance.' 38
The Tenth Circuit in Reazin III affirmed the district court's opinion,
holding that Blue Cross had illegally conspired with the Saints to termi-
nate Wesley in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 139 The case
was remanded to the district court solely to recalculate the amount of
expert witness fees to be awarded. 4'
. Antitrust Guidelines: Guarding Against Unlawful Implied
Agreements In the Provider Network Context
Reazin II and Reazin III demonstrate the antitrust dangers that are
present when managed care plans and providers contract with one an-
other. How should doctors, hospitals, other types of medical providers,
and insurers guard against implied agreements in restraint of trade when
engaging in provider contracting? This Article sets forth the following
guidelines:
L Unilateral Decisionmaking
Contracting decisions should be made unilaterally at all times. Man-
aged care plans constructing provider networks should make independ-
ent decisions concerning the composition of these networks. The needs,
geographic location, and preferences of customers certainly must be
taken into account. However, the managed care plan must ultimately
exercise sole discretion when determining with which providers to con-
tract. Managed care companies can fully utilize their own in-house re-
sources, including in-house medical directors who may be licensed
136. Id. at 1424.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Reazin Ii, 899 F.2d at 963-64.
140. Id. at 983.
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doctors, when making these decisions. But managed care companies
generally should not use outside "consultants," such as local area provid-
ers who are competitors of providers that may ultimately become in-
volved in the network. Discussing the situation with area providers is
strongly discouraged because soliciting the input and advice of these indi-
viduals, either formally as paid consultants or informally as helpful vol-
unteers, may satisfy the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Similarly, providers must independently decide which
managed care plans they will contract with and consequently, which pro-
vider networks they will join. They should therefore not make these de-
terminations in conjunction with other providers in the market.141
Providers should "put their best foot forward" by demonstrating their
medical capabilities to managed care companies. They should never ven-
ture an opinion, however, either orally or in writing, concerning the med-
ical quality, credentials, or fitness of another medical provider. Nor
should providers pressure a health insurer to terminate or avoid doing
business with another provider. According to Monsanto, a court would
most likely find complaints about a provider followed by termination in-
sufficient to constitute an implied agreement among the complaining
providers and the managed care plan to illegally boycott the terminated
party. Nonetheless, when counselling providers, it is advisable to estab-
lish bright-line rules. Furthermore, antitrust lawyers should seek to re-
duce their clients' litigation risks as well as guard against an ultimate
finding of liability. The fact that providers or managed care plans that
are sued for a conspiracy to boycott another provider might ultimately
prevail after several years of litigation should not be the sole motivation
for legal advice. Clients should be directed to avoid behavior that
presents a significant litigation risk as well as a significant liability risk.
Finally, attorneys should inform their provider clients that in addition to
the antitrust risks associated with making statements about the quality of
other providers, a risk also exists that a terminated provider will sue
based upon one or more common-law business torts, such as interference
141. Such decisions should not be made collectively unless all of the providers are members of
the same incorporated practice group or IPA. Furthermore, the IPA must be integrated enough to
qualify as a joint venture under the antitrust laws. See 1 voN KALNowsIU, supra note 21, § 2.05
(discussing joint ventures); Jack R. Bierig, Antitrust Issues Facing Physicians, 30-31 (Jan. 29-31,
1992) (paper presented to the National Association of Health Lawyers, on file with author) (discuss-
ing the application of joint venture analysis to IPAs).
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with an actual or prospective contractual relationship, 4 2 defamation, in-
jury to business reputation, or false advertising.
2. Objective Guidelines
When making network selection decisions, managed care plans should
use objective guidelines that are maintained in writing. In addition, man-
aged care plans should maintain documents that demonstrate that net-
work selection decisions were actually made pursuant to these written,
objective criteria. 143
Objective guidelines may include such factors as: (1) the geographic
location of the provider in question; (2) the geographic location of cus-
tomers (usually employers who purchase group health coverage for their
employees) and individual enrollees; (3) the needs of the managed care
plan for certain kinds of providers in the network; (4) academic creden-
tials of the provider; (5) medical licenses held by the provider; (6) mal-
practice convictions of the provider; and (7) at which hospital(s) the
provider has attained admitting privileges. These written guidelines will
underscore and memorialize the unilateral nature of a managed care
company's decisions concerning provider contracting and network
selection.
3. Avoid Disclosure of Upcoming Decisions
Managed care plans and providers subject themselves to the risk of
attack under the antitrust laws whenever they discuss decisions that have
yet to be made regarding certain providers. Disclosure of future-oriented
information is dangerous because it permits parties to modify and coordi-
nate their behavior in response to the information prior to the occurrence
of the event. Changes in marketplace behavior subsequent to such infor-
mation exchanges may raise suspicions and may constitute circumstan-
tial evidence of an unlawful conspiracy among the party disclosing the
information and the party receiving it.1" Managed care plans should
never disclose upcoming decisions regarding certain providers. A man-
142. This cause of action arose in the Reazin litigation. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
143. In Monsanto, the defendant, Monsanto Company, had drafted a set of objective contracting
criteria. 465 U.S. at 756. Unfortunately for Monsanto, it was unable to demonstrate in the face of
countervailing evidence that it had actually applied its criteria when deciding whether to terminate
the plaintifi's distributorship contract. Id. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
144. For the factors that a court may consider when determining whether an implied agreement
in restraint of trade exists, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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aged care company should never articulate outside the company its in-
tention to terminate a provider or to refuse to renew a provider contract.
In particular, the managed care company should never disclose such in-
tentions to other providers in the market area.
This situation often presents a great temptation to managed care plans.
After deciding to terminate a provider from the network, managed care
plans usually desire to enter into negotiations with a replacement pro-
vider as soon as possible before the actual date of termination. These
negotiations are risky from an antitrust perspective because such discus-
sions may constitute circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to boycott
the terminated provider. 145 Attorneys must counsel managed care com-
panies, as well as replacement providers or those suspecting that they
may be replacement providers, to choose their words carefully and avoid
these types of discussions whenever possible. To the extent that these
discussions are unavoidable, such interactions should be carefully man-
aged and expressed in the manner described below.
4. Communicate in Terms of Patient Volume and Steerage
Provider relations personnel employed by managed care plans some-
times desire to reveal to potential replacement providers their intention
to terminate other providers from the network. Yet, no business reason
exists to disclose this sensitive information. Potential replacement prov-
iders do not need to know the specific identities of those providers that
the managed care plan intends to terminate. Potential replacement prov-
iders only need to be aware of the expected increase in patient volume
resulting from the termination or declination decisions. For their part,
managed care plans also have no compelling business reason for disclos-
ing the specific identities of the providers whose termination is imminent.
They only need to bargain for a favorable price for medical services based
on the number of enrollees in the plan, the volume of patients that they
are capable of steering to the provider, and the number of providers pres-
ent in the network that are capable of handling the medical needs of the
plan's enrollees. Thus, antitrust counselors should advise their clients to
speak in terms of patient volume and the aggregate number of providers
in the network, not specific termination decisions.
Patient volume and patient steerage constitute the core of the managed
care plan/provider relationship. There is no need to disclose sensitive
145. See supra note 144.
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information about specific upcoming termination decisions to providers.
Providers only need to be cognizant of the "downstream" effects on pa-
tient volume and steerage caused by termination decisions.
One way to avoid discussing future terminations periodically through-
out the managed care plan/provider relationship is to insert some form
of elevator clause-a clause that ties compensation to some quantitative
variable-into the provider contract at the outset of the relationship.
This clause might contain a graduated payment provision dependent
upon patient volume (number of enrollees in the plan) and/or the
number of providers in the network. The chief financial officer of the
managed care plan can certify the number of enrollees in the plan and/or
the number of providers in the plan's network on a quarterly or semi-
annual basis. Generally, the fewer the number of providers, the greater
the patient steerage and the lower the capitation or other form of pay-
ment. An elevator clause in the provider contract will obviate the need
to discuss the impact of impending provider terminations with the sur-
viving providers and, as a consequence, will reduce antitrust risks.
5. Sensitivity to Privileged and Non-Privileged Documents and
Discussions
The reader will recall that the President of Blue Cross in the Reazin
litigation placed his company in jeopardy under the antitrust laws by
drafting and then releasing an internal memo that raised the specter of an
antitrust violation.146 Although this officer knew to exercise vigilance
toward the antitrust laws, the manner in which he expressed his vigilance
backfired.
Antitrust advisors should instruct business personnel not to take it
upon themselves to attempt to explain or address antitrust issues. All
communications concerning potential antitrust violations or issues
should be expressed by the company's lawyer or in correspondence ad-
dressed from the business person to the company's lawyer in order to
preserve the attorney-client privilege147 and protect such communica-
146. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
147. The attorney-client privilege protects certain attorney-client communications from discov-
ery. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). The client holds the privi-
lege and may waive it. 8 id. § 2321. The privilege may be claimed not only by natural persons but
also by artificial persons such as corporations. Public communications or communications disclosed
to third parties destroy the privilege. 8 id. § 2311. A federal district court has defined the attorney-
client privilege as follows:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
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tions from discovery. Antitrust counselors should stress to their corpo-
rate clients that attempts by business personnel to explain or describe
legal risks to company employees are generally not protected by the at-
torney-client privilege and are fully discoverable. 148
If an internal investigation is warranted to determine whether an anti-
trust violation has occurred, corporate counsel should either personally
interview employees or closely supervise an employee-directed investiga-
tion. Internal investigations must be under the attorney's strict direction
and control in order to claim the protection from discovery afforded by
the attorney work-product doctrine.149 In addition, a managed care
company's senior officers should be advised not to summarize their pri-
vate discussions with corporate counsel in a memorandum addressed to
their file or to another business person. Such a memorandum may con-
vert a privileged discussion into a non-privileged one and/or may cause
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (ill) assistance in some legal proceed-
ing, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mfg. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally S
WIGMORE, supra § 2292.
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
149. The attorney work-product doctrine provides another discovery exemption. The doctrine
protects materials gathered or work product developed by attorneys in anticipation of potential or
actual litigation. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 147, § 2292. The doctrine had its origins in the 1947
Supreme Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The doctrine eventually was
embodied in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Rule 26(b)(3) states:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under ... this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seek-
ing discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means.
Id.
Antitrust lawyers investigating possible antitrust violations should personally conduct the internal
investigation of the client whenever possible. Legal oversight of the investigation will protect the
work product generated and any documents or materials discovered during the course of the investi-
gation from discovery because of the attorney work-product doctrine. Alternatively, lawyers who do
not conduct the investigation should ensure that the nonlawyers conducting the investigation remain
under the attorney's direction and control. As a prophylactic measure, the company and lawyer
should prepare memoranda for their files documenting that the lawyer is managing and directing the
internal investigation.
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the loss of protection of the attorney work-product doctrine.150 If a need
exists generally to explain past corporate behavior to rank-and-fie em-
ployees, then such company-wide releases should be drafted in close co-
operation with the company's legal counsel.
Occasionally, a provider will send a letter to a managed care plan de-
manding, implicitly or explicitly, that the managed care plan terminate
another provider from the network. Attorneys representing members of
the medical community should advise providers not to write such letters
since they are discoverable and may be construed by a court as an invita-
tion to boycott the other provider. If a managed care company does re-
ceive such a communication, its attorney should advise company officials
to politely thank the sender for the letter (e.g., "The thoughts and input
of our network providers are always appreciated.") and to politely, yet
firmly, state that "as always, decisions concerning the composition of the
provider network are within the sole discretion of the managed care
plan." As the terminated dealer cases illustrate, legitimate business rea-
sons exist for providers and managed care companies to communicate
with one another."' Yet, such communications must be carefully man-
aged and controlled in order to prevent an inadvertent antitrust
violation.
6. Antitrust Education and Guidelines
The relationships between managed care companies and providers
raise a number of serious antitrust issues that antitrust education and
written guidelines can productively address. Preventive lawyering can go
a long way toward avoiding antitrust behavior and possible antitrust vio-
lations. Today health insurers as well as hospitals, doctors, and other
providers of medical care are under strict fiscal constraints. Yet, given
the antitrust risks-hefty monetary penalties and possibly prison
sentences 152 -a little preventive education is money well spent.
V. CONCLUSION
The health care industry is the "number one industry in the United
150. See supra notes 147, 149 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
152. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (violation of § I is a felony
punishable by up to three years imprisonment and a $350,000 fine for individuals and a $10 million
fine for corporations).
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States." 15 3 Perhaps because of its prominence, the industry has come
under increased scrutiny and attack from a variety of quarters.154 The
weapon of choice for prosecutors and private plaintiffs has been the fed-
eral antitrust laws.155 Attorneys must make health insurers, hospitals,
physicians, and other kinds of medical providers aware that many of
their activities are fully subject to the antitrust laws.156
This Article has analyzed and explained the antitrust risks associated
with provider contracting and with the construction and modification of
provider networks in the managed care setting. Noting the dearth15 7 of
written commentary on this critically important subject, this piece has
sought to close this gap. This Article has advanced a paradigm for ana-
lyzing provider network selection decisions from an antitrust perspec-
tive. 58 This paradigm may help scholars, practitioners, and judges
analyze these situations under the antitrust laws. The Article has pro-
vided six recommendations that will significantly reduce the antitrust
risks associated with provider contracting and network selection deci-
sions. Antitrust practitioners should consult these recommendations
when advising their health care clients (whether they are members of the
medical community or the health insurance industry) on how to avoid
high risk behavior and inadvertent antitrust violations.
153. See Motenko, supra note 1.
154. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text
155. See supra notes 16-19, 99-140 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 56.
158. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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